

Purpose tonight is to brief the audience on the Offensive Concept as it stands now.

The problem we've identified involves changing the dynamics in Baghdad – specifically, how do we reduce sectarian violence in and around Baghdad while helping the GOI make progress toward security self-reliance

#### Agenda

- Conditions
- Mission and intent
- Concept sketch by phase
- Associated risk

It's important before we begin to provide some context to this planning effort, particularly since it represents a something of a shift from where MNC-I appeared to be heading with the Transition Bridging Strategy

**The commander sees this operation as a pre-cursor to the accelerated transition contemplated by the bridging strategy; as we progress through the phases, it should become clear that the escalation of offensive activity is intended to set the conditions for the successful implementation of the bridging strategy; in fact, the endstates of both are very similar**

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## SPM Agenda

- Operational Timeline
- Intelligence Assessment
- Proposed Mission
- Proposed Intent
- Initial Concept of Operation
- C2 Relationships – MND-B / MOI / MOD
- Initial Concept of Support
  - Political LOO
  - Economic LOO
  - IO
  - PAO
  - ISF
  - Fires/Effects
  - ALO/Air
  - CMO
  - Engineering
  - Sustainment
  - Force Generation
  - Legal
  - SOF
  - Signal
- Way Ahead / Planning Timeline
- Proposed Names for the Operation

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
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
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
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


AQI conducts HP attacks against Shia civilians, who then seek both protection and retaliation. JAM provides retaliation thru EJKs against Sunni civilians, which causes Sunni civilians to tolerate AQI's activities, to the point of offering safehavens in their homes in exchange for protection against JAM.

As the violence continues, Sunni and Shia ethno-sectarian identities are hardening, undermining the chance for Reconciliation.


JAM benefits from the instability in Iraq because it justifies its reason for existence as the Defender of the Shia.


AQI benefits from the instability in Iraq because it allows T&FF sanctuaries to exist and provides both the motivation and the opportunity for new recruits to join the jihad.




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***Proposed Mission Statement***

**MNC-I conducts combined operations in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts from 15 JAN 07 to 15 MAR 07 in order to reduce sectarian tensions and enhance GOI and ISF legitimacy; on order, fully implement the Bridging Strategy in order to facilitate accelerated transition to Iraqi security self-reliance**

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**This a pre-decisional mission statement**

**It encapsulates the commander's vision of conducting offensive operations focused in and around Baghdad and later shifting to the implementation of the Bridging Strategy – accelerating transition to the ISF once the conditions have been better established to do so**

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## *Proposed Commander's Intent*

- **Purpose**
  - Reduce sectarian tensions in Baghdad and in other Sunni-Shia fault line areas; stabilize the security situation in those areas
  - Demonstrate the GOI seizing the initiative and taking offensive action against AIF; change the dynamics in Baghdad in order to exploit momentum along these lines, setting the conditions for a cease fire and paving the way for national reconciliation
- **Key Tasks**
  - Reduce sectarian violence
  - Neutralize VBIED networks and illegal militias that conduct EJKs
  - Establish the ISF as a capable force, legitimate in the eyes of Iraqi citizens
  - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- **Endstate**
  - Violence in Baghdad reduced to a level manageable for the ISF
  - Iraqis view the ISF as the dominant security force
  - GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it
  - Process of reconciliation initiated under the auspices of a GOI-brokered cease fire
  - MOI reform underway; improvements in the capacity of the Ministries of Health, Industry, and Agriculture initiated
  - Transition to ISSR accelerated IAW the Transition Bridging Strategy
  - CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas, postured to disrupt irreconcilable groups that threaten ISSR and Iraqi reconciliation; enhanced transition teams and dedicated strike forces in place

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
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The commander's intent is pre-decisional as well

It reflects the dual purposes of reducing sectarian tensions while facilitating the GOI's transition to security self-reliance

There are four key tasks leading to an endstate that reduces violence to a manageable level, enhances GOI and ISF legitimacy, and sets both on the path to security self-reliance

At endstate, CF are positioned outside of urban areas, covered down on the ISF with enhanced transition teams, and postured to perform strike operations




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
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
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

















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## Concept of Support Political

<p><b>Concept of Support by Phase:</b></p> <p><b>Phase I:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Prime Minister concurrence regarding concept of operation</li><li>• Prime Minister public announcement indicating support for operation</li><li>• GOI agrees to The Bridging Strategy; signs MOU</li></ul> <p><b>Phase II:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• GOI imposition of additional state of law emergency conditions</li><li>• Steady GOI support for the operation, made clear through periodic statements</li></ul> <p><b>Phase III:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• GOI announcement regarding amnesty and DDR plan</li><li>• Steady GOI support for the operation, made clear through periodic statements</li></ul> <p><b>Phase IV:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Timeline for Provincial elections and Referendums announced</li><li>• Steady GOI support for the operation, made clear through periodic statements</li></ul>	<p><b>CG Actions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Prompt MNF-I and Embassy to engage PM, President, NSA, MoD, MoI and Political Parties to gather support for Operation and Prime Minister</li></ul> <p><b>Resource Requirements:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• N/A</li></ul> <p><b>Issues/Risks:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Operation hinges on strong support from GOI</li><li>• Prime Minister has already approved of concept; but will require Political Party support</li><li>• MNF-I/EMB should continue high-level GOI engagement plan w/ GOI and Political Parties</li><li>• Prime Minister Expectations: ISF in the lead and quicker control/increased training of ISF</li></ul>
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**TRANSITION TO IRAQI SELF RELIANCE**




PHASE I SET CONDITIONS    PHASE II CLEAR, CONTROL, and RETAIN    PHASE III RETAIN and RENEW    PHASE IV TRANSITION and EXPLOIT


15 Jan    15 Mar    1 June

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
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## Concept of Support

### PSYOP / IO



<p><b>Concept of Support by Phase:</b></p> <p><b>Phase I:</b> Reinforce GOI announcements about the operation and calls for a cease-fire / reconciliation using handbills, engagements, and media outlets. Analyze AIF propaganda and misinformation activities in the media and on the internet; be prepared to counter. Continue ongoing operations to reduce violence and militia activities.</p> <p><b>Phase II:</b> Conduct engagements to shape expectations and publicize actions the people can take to accelerate a return to a pre-Samarra environment. Continue reinforcement of GOI announcements and calls for cease-fire / reconciliation. Continue propaganda analysis and counteractions as necessary. Influence key AIF leaders to agree to a cease-fire and conduct specifically targeted degradation of communications. Publicize GOI efforts and CMO to reduce effects of collateral damage. Mitigate loss of public services due to damage. Capitalize on ISF / GOI successes. Focus engagements on key communicators to facilitate transition to ISSR.</p> <p><b>Phase III:</b> No change.</p> <p><b>Phase IV:</b> Continue support to the GOI and reinforce success of the GOI / ISF in the eyes of the Iraqi people.</p>	<p><b>CG Decisions:</b> None</p> <p><b>Resource Requirements:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Additional Tactical PSYOP Detachment per BCT</li> <li>• Require additional aerial EW platforms (up to three EA-6Bs and one EC-130 with two crews)</li> </ul> <p><b>Issues / Risks:</b></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px 0;"> <p style="text-align: center;">1.4b, 1.4d</p> </div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Populace believes Coalition is acting more unilaterally than at the behest of the GOI</li> <li>• Backlash from populace if operation overly disrupts movements during the Hajj / Ashura-Aba'reen</li> <li>• AIF gains the upper hand in the information environment through increased unrestricted propaganda</li> </ul> <p><b>Theme-</b> GOI is taking steps to stop sectarian violence</p> <p><b>IO Task and Purpose-</b> Persuade GOI officials to speak out against all actors involved in sectarian violence</p> <p><b>Theme-</b> ISF is assuming larger role in the security of Iraq</p> <p><b>IO Task and Purpose-</b> Persuade MOI / MOD to support the security plan (moving forces and doing their job)</p>
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


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
Sir, we will support







Good morning sir, (b)(3), (b)(6) senior Public Affairs plans officer. I will be briefing the public affairs concept of support. During phase I of the operation corps public affairs will synchronize a communication plan with STRAFF as well as develop PAG, contingency statements and prepare a detailed press release to be released during Phase II of the operation. During this initial phase we'll look for media opportunities to articulate the need to significantly reduce the level of sectarian violence in Bagdad and reinforce the Coalition's commitment to putting the ISF in the lead thereby setting the conditions for the operation. We expect statements from the Gol and the NCA to nest with Corps statements which we would expect to elude to an increase in forces as already seen in recent reporting of 2/82's movement into Kuwait. Also during this phase Corps will coordinate with MND-B for an embed plan similar to the one executed for the initial phase of Operation Together Forward. During Phase II corps will send out an initial detailed press release and facilitate the embed program with MND-B as planned in Phase I. For embedding, we will focus on US domestic and International media outlets with the assumption that these reports will be picked up in Iraqi media outlets given the constraint that Iraqi media do not embed with Coalition Forces nor are they allowed to embed with ISF. Pan-Arab media will be invited to operational update press conferences and other press events. During this phase it will be critical we ensure the release of timely and accurate information and engage media outlets reporting inaccurate or hyper-editorialized stories. In Phase III we will facilitate media events to reconstruction projects as well as continuing the robust media embed plan. In Phase IV we will highlight operational successes and use combined press conferences to show the ISF's capability to take the lead as we transition to an operational overwatch position. We will continue to engage the media to urge their due diligence in reporting the facts from verifiable sources. PA has no decision points for you at this time. For resource requirements, embedded media may require addition security forces and additional security forces will be needed during scheduled press events such as a media tour through one of the cleared areas. The risk are a perceptions. These perceptions – ISF's inability to control/defeat sectarian violence and that is operation is an act of desperation can be mitigated with a synchronized communication plan; the use of embedded media; the release of timely and accurate information and countering inaccurate media reporting. Pending you questions sir, I will be followed by...















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## Concept of Support ALO

**Concept of Support by Phase:**

**Phase I:** CFACC main effort is interdicting AQI networks IVO Lake Thar Thar to deny flow of destabilizing extremist elements into Baghdad and deny sanctuary to extremists displaced by other operations. CFACC supports other efforts with Interdiction, CAS, EW, Recce and ISR IAW Corps priorities.

**Phase II:** Same as Phase I.

**Phase III:** CFACC supports on-going ops with Interdiction, CAS, EW, Recce and ISR IAW Corps priorities.

**Phase IV:** Same as Phase III.

**CG Decisions**

- Land concept of ops to determine CFACC support plan
- CFACC main effort/priorities to assess/source force requirements


**Resource Requirements:**

- TBD

**Issues/Risks:**

1.4b, 1.4d


- Potential diversion of OEF assets impact on OEF
- Outcome of RFF for ISR surge




15 Jan      15 Mar      1 June

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**FACILITIES:** MND has to submit their engineer requirements / JARB-JFUB packets ASAP / turn around time for approval-funding could be 2 weeks/out of cycle fund request

**JARB/JFUB** to support FP/construction/repairs/services

**EHCC:** fields, train, and track all RC equipment within ITO

**ONS:** 3-buffalo / 20-RG-31 / 8-husky (Jan-June 07)



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## *Basing*



- Larger FOBs can accommodate additional BCT at “surge conditions”
  - Less than CENTCOM Sandbook standard of living
  - Less office and living space per capita
- Bases that currently have capacity for BCT with minimal construction
  - MNF-W – Al Asad
  - MND-B – Taji, Stryker, Liberty
  - MND-N – Warhorse
- Office and motor pool space are limiting factors
- MNDs will be executing agency for distribution of troops


***Basing is NOT a constraint to future planning***

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
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
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Sir,

This slide shows the current Logistic support concept to meet the needs as identified of the 4 phases. The headline issues you should be aware of are that the complete Light BCT set for the DRB will not be ready for issue until 15 Jan, however we can feed units through to meet the equipment flow allowing the majority of the BCT to be in the Baghdad AO to meet the 15 Jan deadline.

#### Phase I:

BCTs draw APS stocks from ARCENT. LBCT set will not be complete for issue until 15 Jan as an equipment set. Equipment flow will be able to meet unit flow if managed in parallel to a 15 Jan deadline. Prioritize Objective Frag 5 Kit installation for UAH Build new Ammo Storage Point within MND-B AO

#### Phase II:

Cross levelling of UAH as necessary to ensure that up armoured UAH are at point of need. Activate & deploy STRYKER maintenance contracts as necessary.

#### Phase III:

ROWPU capacity will need to be increased to meet the population supported. Current production rates mean that bulk water production will only become an issue when the extra 5 BCT set is complete in theater

#### DECISIONS

Cross levelling priorities  
Priorities to relieve Obj Frag 5 Kits  
Controlled supply rates imposed for Aviation and 120mm illum ammo natures  
RFF for additional CSS assets – 2 x Convoy Support Centre(?) 4 x Mov Con Teams, 1 x Cargo Transfer Platoon.  
Potential for need to exceed Net Explosive Weight in Ammo Storage Points.

#### RESOURCES:

UAH allocation to meet the 85% fill rate.  
BRAT tiles for the Bradley uparmour  
Urban area munitions will need to be increased to meet force and patrol activity  
Class IIIB off take expected to rise significantly due to the armoured vehicle increase hence increased contract pull from 1.4b through MNF-W AO and need for increased capacity in tank farms.

#### ISSUES/RISKS


As already highlighted the LBCT set will not be complete for issue until 15 Jan.

ASR ASPEN if activated whilst we are surging forces in will considerably affect our sustainability and ability to surge forces in.

Interdiction of the strategic LOC will have significant impact upon or ability to surge forces in and sustain the increased force level.


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## Concept of Support Surgeon




<p><b>Concept of Support by Phase:</b></p> <p><i>Phase I: Notify Theater Blood Management of casualty estimate increase for kinetic Operations in Phase II. Prepare Forward Surgical Team and equipment for O/O mission to jump as required to provide interventional surgical capability in surg areas. Coordinate with CENTAF for increase in theater STRATEVAC flights to maintain bed availability.</i></p> <p><i>Phase II: O/O move FST as required. Maintain surveillance of bed utilization at Level III Facilities to determine whether theater evacuation policy needs to be amended.</i></p> <p><i>Phase III: O/O redeploy FST as required.</i></p> <p><i>Phase IV: No change</i></p>	<p><b>CG Decisions: None</b></p> <p><b>Resource Requirements: Lift requirement for FST personnel and equipment o/o.</b></p> <p><b>Issues/Risks: Casualty estimates are based on April/Sep 04. Should patient admission rates at Level III facilities exceed 32 patients/day for longer than 4 days, the theater evacuation policy would require amendment to "All stable patients evacuated to Level IV UFN".</b></p> <p><b>Area security posture during phase II could effect medical resupply of 28<sup>th</sup> CSH Baghdad. Shift to air delivery as a primary means would increase air traffic in/out of area increasing exposure to aircrews.</b></p>
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



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






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Sir,

This slide depicts our concept of legal support. In Phase I, there will be no significant changes in the manner in which the SJA section conducts its business. There will also be no changes to the CF OPCON status of IA BDEs in Baghdad. Consequently, they are required to comply with MNC-I ROE in Phase I. Towards the end of Phase II, however, when the IA BDEs in Baghdad transition to IGFC OPCON status, they will operate under Iraqi ROE.

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## Concept of Support CJSOTF

**Concept of Support by Phase:**  
**Phase I:** CJSOTF conducts combined precision intel-driven targeting with select Iraqi IA and IP forces in Baghdad and Baghdad Belt to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks.  
**Phase II:** CJSOTF conducts FID through combined operations advising select IA BDEs in intelligence and operational functions, in order to conduct offensive operations in Baghdad.  
**CJSOTF continues precision intel-driven targeting with select Iraqi IA and IP forces in Baghdad and Baghdad Belt to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks.**

**Partnership Force**

TF Responsibilities		BDE HQ and Staff	
HND	S1	S2	S3
		IA BDE HQ & Strike Element	
		SFODA Responsibilities	

**SFODA**  
 •Trains, advises, mentors S2/S3 to develop, integrate, and synchronize the Intel, Operations and Targeting functions at the brigade level.  
 •Trains and combat advises operations.  
 •Conducts independent assessment.  
 •Develops BDE strike capability (PLT/CQ)

**Partnership Force (PF)/Transition Team**  
 •PF is overall responsible for the training and development of the battalion  
 •PF provides overall operational direction to IA operations  
 •MITT is responsible for developing infrastructure, institutional processes, battalion level staff functions, specialty functions, planning, and C2 capability.  
 •MITT advises all other staff functions during operations in conjunction with SOF advisors.

**Phase III:** CJSOTF continues select FID partnerships.  
**Phase IV:** CJSOTF disengages FID partnerships as transition takes place and continues precision intel-driven targeting with select IA and IP forces in Baghdad and Baghdad Belt to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks.

**Command Relationship with MITT**  
 •Mutual Supporting

**CG Decisions:**  
**COA 1:** RFF ISO Phase II – III (6-9 mos duration):  
 1 X SF FOB (-) consisting of 2 X AOBs and 4 PDAs  
**COA 2:** Assume Risk by reducing or eliminating current CJSOTF line of effort (AQI/AAS targeting north; AQI targeting West; 4 and EFP targeting South IOT shift 4 PDAs to Baghdad.  
**COA 3:** Assume some risk in North (move 4 PDAs to Baghdad) and RFF the rest. (note: CJSOTF is already shifting 6 AAs from the North to conduct 4 effort in South)

**Resource Requirements:**  
 ISR enablers for Phase I - III  
 FUSION CELL Support

1.4c

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**Phase I: CJSOTF conducts combined precision intel-driven targeting with select Iraqi IA and IP forces in Baghdad and Baghdad Belt to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks.**

**Phase II: CJSOTF conducts FID through combined operations advising select IA BDEs in intelligence and operational functions, in order to conduct offensive operations in Baghdad. The select IA BDEs are ones that have assumed battle-space , and are under IGFC control.**

**The delineation of duties of 1.4a and Transition Teams are depicted in the box as well as described underneath. Primarily the ODA focuses**


1.4a, 1.4c

**Phase III: CJSOTF continues select FID partnerships.**


**Phase IV: CJSOTF disengages FID partnerships as transition takes place and continues precision intel-driven targeting with select IA and IP forces in Baghdad and Baghdad Belt to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks**

*The command relationship between the MiTT and 1.4a is mutually supportive.*



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DATE	TIME	MEETING/BRIEFING	NOTES
18 Dec 06	1000	SPM Topic: <b>Receipt of Mission</b>  * Generate WARNO #1	1. Time line 2. Concept slides across LOOs 3. Flow of forces 4. Decision Points (DPs) 5. Command and control 6. Operation naming convention 7. Way Ahead
19 Dec 06	TBD	MNF-I presents concept to MOD & MOI	Concept slides
20 Dec 06	1900 (T)	Briefing to SECDEF	1. Concept 2. Force structure requirements
22 Dec 06	TBD	MNF-I Briefing to GEN Casey	Decision briefing
23 Dec 06	TBD	<b>Mission Analysis Briefing</b>  * Generate WARNO #2	1. Facts & Assumptions 2. Specified and Implied Tasks 3. Prioritize Essential Tasks 4. Define Theater Strategic and Military Endstate 5. Initial CCIR
24 Dec 06	TBD	CG Planners' Huddle	Mission and Commander's Intent
25 Dec 06	1000	SPM Topic: <b>Mission &amp; Commander's Intent</b>	
26 Dec 06	0900	OPT: Situation/COA Development • Geostrategic Analysis • COA Development • COA Analysis • COA Recommendation	[CDR, MNF-I departs to CONUS]  1. Task Organization 2. Subordinate unit missions 3. Recommended CCIR 4. Decision Matrix (as applicable)
29 Dec 06	TBD	<b>COA Briefing</b>  * Generate WARNO #3	Decision Briefing. Output: 1. Approved COA 2. Refined Cdr's Intent & Guidance 3. Refined CCIR
30 Dec 06	0900	OPT: • Strategic Concept • Operational Focus/Subtasks • Joint Organization • Supporting Plans	- Synchronization - C2, Sustainment, Theater Structure - Synchronized with other plans
31 Dec 06		Orders Production	
1 Jan 07	1000	SPM Topic: <b>Order Brief</b>	Audience: MNC-I Cnd & Staff
8 Jan 07	1000	SPM Topic: <b>Order Briefing to Commanders</b>	Conduct Confirmation Briefings
9 Jan 07			[CDR, MNF-I returns to Iraq]
9-12 Jan 07	TBD	Conduct Commander Backbriefs	* Backbrief format in order


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<div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//MR</del></div> <div><b>Operation Naming Convention</b></div> <div></div>	
<b><u>Arabic</u></b>	<b><u>English</u></b>
1.	Restore Hope and Peace
2. <i>Altaghyeer Lilafdhal</i> .....	Change to Betterness
3. <i>Al Aman Al An</i> .....	Security Now
4. <i>Alsiyada Lana</i> .....	We Are in Control
5. <i>Amaliyat Al Yad Al Waheda</i> ....	One Hand
6. <i>Amaliyat Darb Al Aman</i> .....	Pathway to Safety
7. <i>Amaliyat Al Arada Al Hura</i> .....	Free Will
8. <i>Amaliyat Watan Al Ahrar</i> .....	Nation of Free Citizens
<div>40</div> <div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//MR</del></div>	

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Pages 46 through 47 redacted for the following reasons:

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1.4a, 1.4c, 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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<p><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del></p> <h2>Mission Analysis – CJTF</h2> <p>1 of 2</p> <p>POC: <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">(b)(3), (b)(6)</span></p> <p style="text-align: right;">1.4a</p>	
<p><b>Facts</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Currently have 5 Army EOD companies, 7 Joint Service Company equivalents (minus) and 11 WIT Teams Available</li><li>2. 76 JERRVS/ 72 M1114s/7 M1151s/26 M1116s Available</li><li>3. 219 Talon and PacBots robots available</li><li>4. Incoming troops will need CIED Training</li><li>5. 439 RFI Dukes on hand; 380 Dukes remain to be delivered in Dec.</li><li>6. 675 Dukes to be delivered in Jan / Feb (1350 total)</li></ol>	<p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. One modular EOD company or Joint Service equivalent DS per brigade ISO C-IED operations</li><li>2. Current BN command structure capable of able to command and control EOD companies in the MND-B area</li><li>3. Up to 8 additional EOD Companies and 3-5 WITs may be required</li><li>4. Up Armored HMMWVs (UAH) will be extremely limited due to additional force flow</li><li>5. Duke Fielding all MND-B and MND-N BCTs and Corps Separates will be at a minimum HP CREW Ratio of 1:2</li><li>6. At a 1:2 HP CREW ration; fielding 5 BCTs will require approx. 1800 Dukes</li></ol>
<p><b>Constraints</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Up to 8 additional EOD companies and 11 additional WITs available by extending current tours beyond redeployment dates; requires SECDEF approval.</li><li>2. Number of C-IED trainers limited. Current POI not possible due to time constraints</li><li>3. Duke Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces 900 Dukes per month</li></ol>	
<p style="text-align: right;">45</p> <p><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del></p>	

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<div><div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP</del></div><h1>Mission Analysis – CJTF</h1><div>2 of 2</div><div>1.4a</div><div></div></div>	
POC <div>(b)(3), (b)(6)</div>	
<b>Specified Tasks</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Provide specialized C-IED forces to support the planned operation</li><li>2. Provide WIT and CEXC, IED technical intelligence and forensics support for the planned operation</li><li>3. Provide specialized Electronic Warfare (EW) capability to support the planned operation</li></ol>	<b>Issues / Risks</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. IF EOD forces are not extended, EOD support will be constrained by the number of companies providing essential force protection to widely dispersed operating bases</li><li>2. IF WIT forces are not extended, WIT support will be constrained by number of WIT (teams) providing technical exploitation to widely dispersed operating bases</li></ol>
<b>Implied Tasks</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Provide command/control and support of additional EOD forces</li><li>2. Provide priority Tech/Intel, Forensics and exploitation support</li><li>3. Dispose of captured enemy munitions and IEDs</li><li>4. As part of RSOI, train all soldiers in C-IED, EW, and Cache exploitation</li></ol>	
<div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP</del></div> <div>46</div>	

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<div><div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP</del></div><h1>Mission Analysis – (Fires/Effects)</h1><div>1 of 2</div><div></div></div>	
POC: <div>(b)(3), (b)(6)</div>	
<b>Facts</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. C/2-4 FA (MLRS) currently positioned in MNF-W</li><li>2. See attached map for GMLRS and ATACMS ranges from current position</li><li>3. Ammo status: GMLRS (Iraq – 216, Kuwait – 162); ATACMS (Iraq – 5, Kuwait 9)</li><li>4. MLRS Btry split ops capability for limited time</li><li>5. 5xUSMC and 2xUSN Prowlers in ITO</li><li>6. Prowler – Minutes Flown/Requested (8457/21259 = 40%)</li><li>7. <div>1.4a, 1.4g</div></li></ol>	<b>Assumptions</b> <div><div>1.4g</div></div> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>2. BCTs will deploy with all organic indirect fire support systems and radars</li></ol>
<b>Constraints</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. 1xMLRS Btry in ITO, may require Btry split ops</li><li>2. Btry split ops will require additional resources to augment firing PLT</li><li>2. MND-SE policy on counter-fire permits response only if CF "eyes on"</li><li>3. Any repositioning of radars will require forces for force protection</li></ol>	

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<div style="text-align: center;"><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del> <b>Mission Analysis – (Fires/Effects) 2 of 2</b> POC: <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">(b)(3), (b)(6)</span></div>	
<b>Specified Tasks</b> 1. Conduct a 90 day assessment on the progress of operations in reducing sectarian violence	<b>Issues / Risks</b> 1. Need additional EW assets (18 hours/another prowler sqn)
<b>Implied Tasks</b> <u>Joint Fires:</u> 1. Provide GMLRS fires to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks around baghdad and in threat support areas 2. Provide GMLRS fires to disrupt AQI and militia activities around baghdad and in threat support areas 3. BPT to conduct Btry split operations to cover more areas in the ITO <u>Engagements: (engagements developing)</u> 1. Engage key leaders (political and religious) to denounce violence and discourage participating in militia/insurgent activity 2. Engage key leaders to support "martial law" and assist in explaining to populace purpose of operations 3. Engage Key political leaders to support all specified starting conditions and to facilitate transition to ISSR <u>Assessments:</u> 1. Conduct a 180 day assessment on the progress of operations in the enhancement of GOI and ISF legitimacy 2. Conduct monthly assessments on all effects, focusing on essential effects by phase	<b>Essential Effects by Phase:</b> (Focus of effects will overlap by phase and location)  <u>Phase I - II:</u> Control the Borders Insurgency Neutralized Enable the GOI to break the cycle of sectarian violence and prevent its spread  <u>Phase III:</u> IPS in the Lead IA in the Lead  <u>Phase IV:</u> Development of Local and Provincial Gov't Develop Strategic Infrastructure Increase availability Basic Services Develop Economic Opportunities

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<div style="text-align: center;"><div style="display: inline-block; text-align: center;"><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del> <b>Mission Analysis – ALO</b> 1 of 2 POC: <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">(b)(3), (b)(6)</span></div></div>	
<b>Facts</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Baghdad airspace saturated above coordination altitude</li><li>2. By Jan 07, <input type="checkbox"/> X F-16 Balad, <input type="checkbox"/> X A-10 Al Asad, <input type="checkbox"/> X GR-4 supporting Iraq</li><li>3. CFACC can reposition assets to support focused ops ISO OIF. B-1Bs, F-15Es <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">1.4C</span> and surge tankers from <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;"></span> possible</li></ol>	<b>Assumptions</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Air support requirements continue for existing BCTs via ASRs</li><li>2. OCF-I and CJSOTF continue to conduct majority of air ops in Baghdad city</li><li>3. Carrier group will augment CENTAF, if required</li><li>4. In-place Iraq USAF air C2 system sufficient for task</li><li>5. Sufficient number of JFOs with Transition Teams</li><li>6. Increase in kinetic ops</li><li>7. ROE 'relaxed'</li></ol>
<b>Constraints</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Air refueling tanker limitations, especially for carrier group</li><li>2. MND-SE distance from majority of air ops in Baghdad/North WRT response time and tanker support</li></ol>	
<div style="text-align: right;"><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del> 49</div>	

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<div><div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//MR</del></div><div><b>Mission Analysis – ALO</b> 2 of 2</div><div></div></div>	
POC: <div>(b)(3), (b)(6)</div>	
<b>Specified Tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Disrupt VBIED networks in and around Baghdad</li><li>Disrupt EFP networks</li><li>Neutralize illegal militias that conduct EJKs</li><li>Isolate extremists in and around Baghdad</li></ul>	<b>Issues / Risks</b> <div>1. CFACC assets, if employed in a focused, synergistic manner can take a major role in the offensive and mitigate ground force number limitations.</div> <div>2. Given appropriate ROE/PID and with joint force assistance, CFACC could potentially take complete responsibility for the following tasks ranked in order of feasibility:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Lake Thar Thar<div>1.4b, 1.4d</div></li></ul></div> <div>3. CFACC force potentials for limited duration operation<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Surge Iraq-based aircraft</li><li>2. Reapportion/surge 1.4b based assets currently supporting OEF</li><li>3. Request one, possibly two, carrier groups</li><li>4. Revisit OCF-I and CJSOTF ISR asset usage to optimize and free up assets for proposed operation</li></ul></div>
<b>Implied Tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Conduct strike operations</li><li>Synchronize and prioritize ISR; determine additional requirements</li><li><u>Baghdad Bolt</u> – Disrupt support and staging areas feeding VBIED and SVBIED resources to Baghdad</li><li><u>Lake Thar Thar</u> – Deny AQI training and basing areas<div>1.4b, 1.4d</div></li><li><u>Ramadi-Falluja-Abu Ghraib</u> – Disrupt AQI networks</li><li>Deny the flow of destabilizing extremist elements into Baghdad</li><li>Coordinate assets/fuse data to facilitate targeting (F2T2EA)</li></ul>	

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